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Abstract:
Debt issue credit ratings can lead to conflicts of interest as the issuer itself is entrusted with contracting and 
compensating the rating agency. Into the bargain, the credit rating agency may be involved in designing the issues 
that the same agency subsequently rates. Credit rating agencies thus could have incentives to rate issues advanta-
geously. Given the economic importance of this issue, in this paper we have proposed to analyze this phenomenon, 
known as rating shopping in academic literature, for Spanish market securitization issues for the period of time 
comprehensive from January 1993 to December 2011. In sum 3,665 published ratings are been analysed, for 
an issued nominal amount of 791,090 million Euros. The results show an association between the credit rating 
agency contracted and the mean rating awarded. Significant differences are observed in the ratings associated to 
the contracting manager (or special purpose vehicle –SPV- manager firm), to the number of ratings or to the type 
of collateral. Furthermore, a pattern compatible with rating shopping was observed for some types of collateral: 
abnormally high market shares associated with certain agencies awarding unusually generous ratings. However, 
this phenomenon is not seen to be widespread on the rating market associated to Spanish securitization issues.
Keywords:
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Resumen:
Las calificaciones crediticias de las emisiones de deuda pueden plantear un conflicto de intereses al ser el 
propio emisor el encargado de contratar y retribuir a la agencia de calificación, y a que ésta puede participar en 
el diseño de las emisiones que posteriormente califica. Así, se pueden generar incentivos para que las agencias 
de calificación otorguen calificaciones ventajosas a las emisiones. En este trabajo, analizamos este fenómeno, 
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conocido en la literatura académica como compra de calificaciones crediticias o arbitraje de ratings, para el 
conjunto de las emisiones de titulización realizadas en el mercado español en el periodo comprendido entre enero 
de 1993 y diciembre de 2011. En términos acumulados se han analizado 3.665 calificaciones de crédito o ratings, 
asociados a un volumen nominal emitido de bonos de titulización de 791.090 millones de euros. Los resultados 
evidencian una asociación entre la agencia otorgante y el rating medio otorgado, observándose diferencias 
significativas en los ratings asociados a la sociedad gestora contratante, al número de ratings o al colateral de 
respaldo. Además, para algún tipo de colateral se observa un patrón compatible con el rating shopping: cuotas 
de mercado anormalmente elevadas asociadas a ciertas agencias otorgantes de ratings anormalmente generosos. 
No obstante, este fenómeno no se observa de forma generalizada en el mercado de ratings asociado a las emi-
siones de titulización españolas.
Palabras clave:
Agencias de calificación, rating, titulización, compra de calificaciones, arbitraje de ratings.
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1.   INTRODUCTION
Obtaining a reliable, objective and external rating of the quality of the securitization 
issue is a determining factor to perform efficiently the resource-generation and risk-trans-
mission processes on the capital markets (Abad and Robles, 2007; Deprés, 2011; Abad et 
al., 2012). Credit rating agencies (hereinafter CRAs) have played a particularly important 
role in the securitization operations performed in the financial systems of different coun-
tries (see Otero et al. (2013) for the Spanish market). As Blancheton et al. (2012) argue, 
the complexity and opacity of these operations help to understand the key role of the rating 
agencies when rating those products. In fact, different national regulations require a credit 
rating for an issue to proceed. However, the sharp deterioration of the credit ratings and 
drop in value of the securitizations has raised questions about the performance of the rating 
agencies. 
Three sources of conflict in CRA performance can be identified on the credit rating mar-
ket: (1) CRA conflict due to understating risk to attract business, (2) issuers’ tendency to pur-
chase only the most favourable ratings, and (3) the trusting nature of some investor clientele 
. Research, such as Ashcraft et al. (2010) or Mathis et al. (2009), has confirmed the relax-
ation of the rating processes for mortgage-backed securitization bonds during the years 
leading up to the financial crisis. On the other hand, Griffin & Tang (2012) and Hull & 
White (2010a) detect evidence of the subjective opinions of rating agencies allowing the 
ratings of the collateralized debt obligations (CDO) to be inflated. 
As Bolton et al. (2012) indicate these conflicts create two distortions. First, competition 
among CRAs can reduce efficiency as it facilitates rating shopping. Second, ratings are 
more likely to be inflated during boom periods and when investors are more trusting. Our 
paper focuses on the analysis of this first distortion where the intense competition between 
CRAs and the problem of rating shopping are related. 
In this line, Becker & Milbourn (2011) show that the quality of the rating is inversely 
related to the number of active rating agencies, concluding that the strong competition on 
the rating market helps to foster the cherry picking strategy by the issuers, that is, that the 
latter end up contracting the services of those agencies that better rate their assets (rating 
shopping).
We have, therefore, taken into consideration, on the one hand, the market structure of 
the CRAs and, on the other hand, practically all the securitization operations performed in 
the Spanish financial system. The Spanish securitization market is a major market as it has 
risen as high as third place on the world ranking. We have thus gathered information on 
3,665 credit ratings for an issued nominal amount of 791,090 million euros (approximately 
1 trillion USD) for the period 1993-2011.
The main objective of this paper is to establish whether there is evidence that the “rat-
ing shopping” phenomenon has occurred on the Spanish market. The non-uniform distri-
bution among the agencies rating the issues, both in terms of the fund managers (SG) and 
in terms of types of collateral, can be considered to be an indication of rating shopping, as 
if fund managers have a certain preference for the services of one or other rating agency 
to assess certain types of securitization bonds, they can be considered to be searching for 
a particularly favourable rating. Thus, we extend the literature by focusing on the specific 
linkages between abnormally large (small) CRA’s market share by type of collateral with 
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abnormally lower (higher) ratings. Our results do not clearly support the conclusions de-
fended by earlier studies focused on other markets as we do not find evidence that is com-
patible with rating shopping.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following section reviews the related 
scientific literature and sets out the research hypotheses. The third section analyses the 
characteristics of the securitizations performed in Spain, along with the market structure of 
the credit rating of those securitizations. The fourth section verifies the hypotheses regard-
ing the existence of rating shopping on the Spanish securitization market. The last section 
concludes.
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS APROACH 
Numerous studies provide evidence of the existence of rating shopping. Thus, Skreta and 
Veldkamp (2009) claim that the greater the complexity of the financial securities to be rated, 
the greater the incentives and rewards for issuers to perform rating shopping. Benmelech 
and Dlugosz (2010), studying a worldwide CDO (collateralized debt obligations) sample for 
2005-2008, find that the tranches rated by a single agency (particularly Standard and Poor’s) 
were more frequently downgraded than those rated by more than one agency. Specifically, 
in the CDO segment, Standard and Poor’s was known for applying generous assumptions, 
which helped it to attain a dominant position in the business rating CDO issues. Thus, if 
we only refer to the tranches assessed by a single agency, Standard and Poor’s accounts 
for nearly 70% of the share in this segment, compared to 20% for Fitch Ratings and 10% 
for Moody’s (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2010). Morkötter and Westerfield (2009) find rating 
patterns in a sample of 231 international collateralized debt obligation issues (CDO) between 
August and December 2006. These are consistent with the theoretical models developed by 
Fender and Kiff (2005). The latter argue that it is more feasible for the senior tranches (the 
largest volume and less risky) to be rated by Moody’s –an agency that uses rating models 
based on expected loss–, and for equity-mezzanine tranches (with a smaller volume and more 
risky) to be rated by Fitch and Standard and Poor’s –which use rating models based on the 
default probability. In turn, regarding the 2009 re-securitization market (on other words, se-
curities whose collateral is asset-backed bonds: Re-Remics), Kiff (2010) finds that the DBRS 
rating agency obtained 43% of the market share in 2009 (compared to barely 7% in 2007) 
. Precisely, this agency awarded the ratings on the estimated default probability, which tends 
to rate the mezzanine tranches comparatively better than when other methods are used.
The series of hypotheses put forward to analyze the existence of rating shopping on the 
Spanish securitization market are set out synoptically in Figure 1. The proposed hypotheses 
are stated in three successive levels. We first present the excluding hypothesis, relating to 
the existence of a uniform distribution in the choice of the CRA, taking the applicant SG or 
the type of collateral as a factor. We consider this hypothesis to be excluding given that its 
verification would be highly incompatible with a scenario when practices relating to rating 
shopping concur. A rating market when the CRAs enjoy similar market shares, irrespective 
of the SG (client) and the type of collateral, is highly incompatible with widespread rating 
shopping. Thus, the first hypothesis, with its two sub-hypotheses, is as follows:
H1 (Excluding condition): The choice of the CRA is uniformly distributed.
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H1a: The choice of the CRA is uniformly distributed by applicant SGFT.
H1b: The choice of the CRA is uniformly distributed by type of collateral.
The second analysis level, considered in case of the previous hypothesis (HI) being 
rejected, refers to significant differences existing in the rating awarded by the CRAs and 
by the number of participating CRAs. Thus, even though a CRA enjoys an abnormally 
high market share (for a specific SG or type of collateral), if the mean rating awarded is 
not significantly different to the one awarded by the other CRAs, rating shopping cannot 
be concluded to exist. Similarly, given that rating shopping is based on choosing the CRA 
based on looking for a more favourable rating, the concurrent publication of several ratings 
simultaneously awarded by different agencies must reduce and, in extremis, eliminate the 
practice of rating shopping. Thus, the existence of a direct relationship between the number 
of participant CRAs and the mean rating offered is another indication of the existence of 
rating shopping. Therefore, we consider this second condition to be necessary for rating 
shopping to be deemed to exist and the relevant hypothesis is written as follows:
H2 (Necessary condition): There are significant differences in the rating awarded by 
the different CRAs. 
H2a: There are significant differences in the rating awarded by the CRA.
H2b: There are significant differences in the rating awarded by a number of CRAs.
If the previous hypothesis is accepted, we complete our study by analysing correspond-
ences aimed at establishing whether the CRAs that have abnormally high (small) market 
shares for specific segments, offer abnormally high (reduced) ratings in those same seg-
ments. We consider this relation to be sufficient, given that its verification would imply the 
existence of rating shopping. Thus, the third and final propose hypothesis is as follows:
H3 (Sufficient condition): The favourable (unfavourable) bias in the rating awarded 
by a CRA is related to an abnormally high (reduced) market share associated to that CRA.
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Figure 1 
Proposed hypothesis to test the existence of rating shopping
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SECURITIZATION IN SPAIN AND MARKET 
STRUCTURE OF THE RATING AGENCIES
3.1. Target population and information sources 
The object of study of this research includes all asset-backed bonds issued in Spain 
from when they were first released in 1993 until 2011, irrespective of their legal status or 
trading market. Specifically, all the securitization funds are considered whose issue pro-
spectuses were registered with the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
funds have been excluded whose asset-backed bonds are not aimed at being placed on the 
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Spanish fixed yield markets, mainly the AIAF market and, to a lesser extent, the Barcelona 
Stock Exchange. It should be noted that the funds that do not fulfil this condition (“private 
funds”) are very rare and account for a residual volume as regards the total. In turn, and 
given that the object of our analysis is securitization by means of issuing asset-backed 
bonds, we have here discarded the securitization funds that issue promissory notes instead 
of bonds. In the same way as in the previous case, the number of funds based on promisso-
ry notes is very scarce. Thus, out of a total of 653 securitization funds, only five have been 
funded by means of promissory notes, compared to 648 that were via asset-backed bonds.
The set of 648 securitization funds included in our analysis have issued a total of 
791,090 million euros, based on 2,156 different series of asset-backed bonds. They were 
established on the basis of 2,052 asset transfers during the 19 years in the study, meaning 
that there were 3,665 credit ratings. The ratings analysed refer to the ratings awarded to the 
securitization bonds at the time of issue. Information prospectuses that the Securitization 
Fund Managers (SGFT) filed to be verified and registered by the Spanish Securities and 
Exchange Commission (CNMV), associated to each of the securitization funds set up in 
Spain between 1993 and 2011, are the main information source used in this paper. 
3.2. Legal status and type of securitization funds set up in Spain
There are two figures in the Spanish legal system that provide the legal basis for estab-
lishing of securitization funds or what are commonly known as Special Purpose Vehicle 
–SPV–: Mortgage Securitization Funds (MSFs or “Fondos de Titulización Hipotecaria” –
hereinafter FTH–) and Asset Securitization Funds (or “Fondos de Titulización de Activos” 
–hereinafter FTA–). Their differential characteristics are indicated below.
The MSFs are fundamentally governed by the Unit Trusts and Mutual Trust Compa-
nies and Mortgage Securitization Funds Act 19/1992, of 7 July, and may only be set up to 
convey mortgages by means of the so-called Participaciones Hipotecarias (hereinafter PH). 
The “eligible” or prime mortgage loans that underwrite their setting up must meet the de-
manding requirements set by the Mortgage Market Act (Act 2/1981, of 25 March, amended 
by Act 41/2007, of 7 December). This legislation envisages that they are underwritten by 
the first mortgage on the freehold of the whole property and that, in general, the loan/value 
ratio (Loan to Value or LTV) is 60%-80%, that is, the nominal amount of the loan does 
not exceed 60% of the appraisal value of the mortgaged assets, or 80% if the constructing, 
refurbishing or purchasing of housing is being financed.
Unlike the above, the FTA, regulated by Royal Decree 926/1998, of 15 May, can be 
used to assign any type of credit or future or present collection right. In fact, even though 
the FTA can also be used to transfer mortgage loans by means of PH, Mortgage Transfer 
Certificates (MTCs or “Certificados de Transmisión Hipotecaria” –hereinafter CTH–) are 
most frequently used in the case of mortgage loans being transferred. These securities 
enable the transfer of mortgage loans that do not comply with the requirements of the 
aforementioned PH.
Even though only these two securitization fund figures legally exist, we have deemed 
it appropriate to differentiate explicitly a specific type of securitization funds, within the 
FTA: what we could call “FTA Cédulas Multicedentes –FTA-Cover Bonds or FTA-CM–”, 
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as they are the means for the transfer of Covered Bond (CM) (“Cédulas Hipotecarias” –
hereinafter CH–) and Regional Covered Bonds (RCB) (“Cédulas Territoriales” –hereinaf-
ter CT–). In fact, the name of the FTAs that have CH or CT as collateral includes the term 
“Covered Bonds” (–hereinafter CB–), “Note” or similar. Focusing on the most relevant 
sub-category3, the CB are mortgage market securities that are backed by the whole mort-
gage portfolio of the transferring entity and which is not already being used as collateral 
for other issued mortgage securities. Therefore, CB securitization can be considered to 
come under CDO (Collateralized Debt Obligations) securitization, given that the collateral 
of those funds is a reduced number of CBs (usually a single security transferred by each 
assignor), but with a very high individual nominal amount (per covered bond). Another 
differentiating characteristic is that a very high number of issuers (or assignors) usually 
participate. In fact, there is a separate section for this type of securitization bonds on the 
AIAF market, referring, precisely, to the high number of entities that act as asset assignors: 
“Asset Securitization Bonds - Multi-seller Covered Bonds” (FTA Cédulas Multicedentes 
–hereinafter FTA-CM–). Moreover, the issues of FTA-CM securitization bonds have a 
further two differentiating characteristics. On the one hand, all the issues have had a max-
imum rating (AAA) and even though different series of tranches are issued for each fund, 
the internal structure of these issues are not designed for some tranches to be guarantees 
or credit enhancement over others. On the other hand, the majority of those securitization 
bonds have fixed-rate coupon bonds, which is not the case of the other FTAs and the FTHs, 
whose issues offer, in their vast majority, indexed and variable-rate coupon bonds. 
In short, we believe it appropriate to begin by analyzing the securitization funds set up 
in Spain and their securitization bonds issued. We will start with the aforementioned clas-
sification: FTH (Mortgage Securitization Funds), FTA (Asset Securitization Funds) and 
FTA-CM (Asset Securitization Funds - Multi-seller Covered Bonds). Table 1 shows the 
nominal amount issued for each of these types of fund in each of the years studied.
3  CTs, which account for less than 2% of the collateral of all the FTA-CMs, are similar securities to the CHs, but 
they are backed by the loans and credit awarded by the issuer to the State, Autonomous Regions, local entities and 
dependent regional institutions. 
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3.3. Rating agencies 
Four agencies were operating on the securitization bond credit rating in Spain during 
the period in question. Listed in order of importance, the agencies were Moody’s Inves-
tor Service (Moody’s), Standard and Poor’s Rating (SP), Fitch IBCA (Fitch) and DBRS. 
Moody’s and SP began operating in Spain in 1993, Fitch in 1995 and DBRS in 2010. Table 
2 shows the market share of these four agencies broken down by years. It should be noted 
that the ratings were awarded to the different securitization bond tranches into which the 
securitization funds are divided. In turn, the same agencies rated all the tranches in prac-
tically all of the securitization funds. In other words, if one or several agencies rated the 
senior or privileged tranches, those same agencies rated the other tranches. The market 
share for each agency and year has been calculated taking into account the rated volume 
for each agency, with respect to the total volume of rated bonds in that same year. Given 
that a single bond tranches is frequently rated by more than one agency, the volume of rated 
tranches is higher than the volume of tranches issued. 
Table 2 shows that, at least three rating agencies always participated, SP, Moody’s and 
Fitch, except in four of the five first years. As has already been indicated, the fourth agency, 
DBRS, entered the equation in 2010. By global market share (see last column), it can be 
seen that Moody’s is in first place, not only as an aggregate, with an average share of 43%, 
but also in each of the years studied. SP is in second place, with nearly a third of the rating. 
It also held this second place for 17 out of the 19 years studied. Fitch was in third place in 
order of importance, with 21.2% of average market share. The importance of this agency 
was the one that most fluctuated during the period, between the second or fourth place. In 
fact, the appearance of DBRS, with a modest stake in 2010 (4.2%) and a key role in 2011, 
when it was in second place with 31% of the market share, relegated Fitch to fourth place 
in the last year of the study period. It can also be noted that the market share obtained by 
DBRS can basically be attributed to the drop in the SP share.
The first conclusion that can be reached is that the market structure of the credit rating 
of Spanish securitization is oligopolistic, given that there are very few companies offering 
this service.
3.4. Collateral assets used in the securitization operations 
Even though the legal status of the securitization funds conditions the type of asset used 
as collateral, we believe it to be highly relevant to delve further into this aspect to analyze 
the main aggregates mobilized by means of the securitization operations in Spain.
Table 3 shows the main types of assets assigned in securitization operations. In first 
place, by order of importance, is the segment of the securitization bonds guaranteed by 
CTHs in the framework of the FTAs, representing more than one third of all issues. It 
should be noted that the funds that are frequently established on this type of collateral 
(CTH) also have PH as secured assets. In other words, that part of the portfolio of mortgage 
loans used as secured assets in the same securitization fund, complies with the require-
ments of the Mortgage Market Act to become “eligible” loans (PH) and another part does 
not (CTH). 
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CH, mortgage market securities covered by the whole of the mortgage portfolio of the 
issuing credit institutions are in second place. This type of collateral accounts for most of 
the FTA-CM.
In third and fourth place are the loans awarded to non-financial companies in general 
(14%) and SMEs in particular (9%). This last category would include loans to the self-em-
ployed. Loans to SMEs are credit rights deriving from loans awarded to Spanish non-fi-
nancial companies that comply with the definition of an SME by the European Union or by 
the national legislation. These loans are frequently encouraged by the State to improve the 
business financing conditions. In fact, some series of securitization bonds of many funds 
established on loans to SMEs are underwritten by the State or the ICO, and to a less extent, 
with the endorsement of other institutions (above all the Generalitat de Catalunya - the 
Autonomous Government of Catalonia). This means that the issues are placed under bet-
ter conditions, in exchange for the credit institutions undertaking to reinvest the liquidity 
obtained into new lines of funding for SMEs. The sum of these two last categories come 
to 23.6% and if the 1.3% of the securitization bond operations whose collateral is leasing 
operations is then added, it can be concluded that a fourth of the securitization issues are 
directly related to business activity. In any event, many of the loans to companies and to 
SMEs are in turn secured by mortgages.
The fifth major block (7%) is made up of the PH, the basis of the FTH in Spain and 
representing the best mortgage credits (prime mortgage). They are followed by personal 
and consumer loans (5%), which include loans to buy cars.
The mediation lines of the Official Credit Institute (2%), the financial leasing agree-
ments (1.3%), the collection rights deriving from the Nuclear Moratorium (1.3%), the 
rights deriving from the Tariff Deficit (1.3%), the CT (0.04%) and credits to Public Admin-
istrations (0.4%). The “Others” category (2%) includes the CDO securitizations (treasury 
bonds, simple bonds, etc.), wind power collection rights, subordinated debt, etc.
It should be noted that the mortgage secured credit portfolio of the credit institutions 
accounted for the largest collateral used in the Spanish securitization operations. It rep-
resents all of the PH, CTH and CH segments (63.1%) of the total, plus an important part 
of the financing awarded to companies and SMEs (23.6% in total) that, even though it is 
classified in those epigraphs, can also be mortgage secured. 
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3.5. Securitization Fund Managers (SGFT)
Spanish legislation envisages a key role for the Mortgage Securitization Fund Manager, 
in particular (Act 19/1992), and to the Securitization Fund Managers (Sociedades Gestoras 
de Fondos de Titulización or SGFT), in general, when this type of funds were regulated 
(RD 926/1998). Precisely, Article 12 of that Royal Decree establishes the corporate pur-
pose of the SGFT, specifying that their exclusive purpose is to set up, administer and the 
legal representation of the securitization funds. In turn, they will be tasked, as managers of 
external businesses, with the representation and defence of the interests of the holders of 
the securities issued against the funds that they administer and of their remaining ordinary 
creditors.
Having reached this point of the descriptive analysis of securitization in Spain, we 
consider it to be of interest to analyze how the securitization business is distributed among 
the different authorized managers in Spain. There are seven SGFTs in Spain that have been 
operating, practically, since the start of the historical securitization process in Spain. 
1. Ahorro y Titulización, S.G.F.T., S.A. (AyT): Incorporated in 1993. There is a par-
ticular prevalence of savings banks, even though it welcomes other stakeholders 
in principle. It is the leading SGFT operating in Spain, in terms of the nominal 
amount of the established and managed securitization funds (22.8%).
2. Titulización de Activos, S.G.F.T., S.A. (TdA): Incorporated in 1992. It is the sec-
ond SGFT in terms of volume of assets managed (21.1%).
3. Europea de Titulización, S.G.F.T., S.A. (ET): Incorporated in 1993. It is in third 
place in terms of market share (20.6%).
4. Santander de Titulización, S.G.F.T., S.A. (ST): Incorporated in 1992. It is in fourth 
place in terms of market share (14.2%), some way behind the first three.
5. Intermoney Titulización, S.G.F.T., S.A. (IM): Founded in 2003, even though it 
started trading in 2004, it is part of the CIMD, S.A. holding company. It is in fifth 
place as it manages 10.8% of the securitized assets. 
6. Gesticaixa, S.G.F.T., S.A. (GC): Registered in the Barcelona Trade Registry in 
1987. It is in last but one place in terms of market share (7.2%). 
7. Gestión de Activos Titulizados, S.G.F.T., S.A. (GAT): Incorporated in 1998. With 
barely 3.3%, it is in last place in the SGFT ranking by market share.
4. ANALYSIS OF THE RATINGS AWARDED TO THE SPANISH SECURITIZA-
TION BONDS 
As stated in H1, the existence of uniform distributions in the market shares associated 
to the ratings agencies, both in terms of managers (H1a) and of types of collateral (H1b), 
is an excluding condition to the existence of rating shopping. If the managers have a cer-
tain preference for using the services of a certain rating agency to assess certain types of 
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securitization bonds, they could be choosing the rating agencies according to the likelihood 
of obtaining more favourable ratings. Should no uniform distributions be observed, that 
pattern would have to be checked to see whether it effectively complies with obtaining a 
better credit rating. 
Table 4
Distribution of the rating agencies for each manager
Source: Compilation based on information supplied by the prospectuses registered by CNMV associated to each 
of the securitization funds set up in Spain between 1993 and 2011. AyT: Ahorro y Titulización, S.G.F.T.; TdA: 
Titulización de Activos, S.G.F.T.; ET: Europea de Titulización, S.G.F.T.; ST: Santander de Titulización, S.G.F.T.; 
IM: Intermoney Titulización, S.G.F.T.; GC: Gesticaixa, S.G.F.T.; GAT: Gestión de Activos Titulizados, S.G.F.T. 
The Chi Square test associated to the uniformity in the distributions has a level of significance under 1% and 
therefore the null hypothesis of distribution equality. It is therefore concluded that the choice of the rating agency 
by the managers is not uniform.
AGENCY TOTALDBRS FITCH MOODY’S SP
AYT
Observed frequency 4 101 118 94 317
Expected frequency 6.8 70.2 142.3 97.7 317.0
% dentro de SGFT 1.3% 31.9% 37.2% 29.7% 100.0%
ET
Observed frequency 2 50 144 83 279
Expected frequency 6.0 61.8 125.3 85.9 279.0
% within SGFT 0.7% 17.9% 51.6% 29.7% 100.0%
GAT
Observed frequency 1 11 37 15 64
Expected frequency 1.4 14.2 28.7 19.7 64.0
% within SGFT 1.6% 17.2% 57.8% 23.4% 100.0%
GC
Observed frequency 6 16 48 27 97
Expected frequency 2.1 21.5 43.6 29.9 97.0
% within SGFT 6.2% 16.5% 49.5% 27.8% 100.0%
IM
Observed frequency 6 24 61 38 129
Expected frequency 2.8 28.6 57.9 39.7 129.0
% within SGFT 4.7% 18.6% 47.3% 29.5% 100.0%
ST
Observed frequency 7 27 64 56 154
Expected frequency 3.3 34.1 69.2 47.4 154.0
% within SGFT 4.5% 17.5% 41.6% 36.4% 100.0%
TDA
Observed frequency 2 60 114 89 265
Expected frequency 5.7 58.7 119.0 81.6 265.0
% within SGFT 0.8% 22.6% 43.0% 33.6% 100.0%
Total
Observed frequency 28 289 586 402 1305
Expected frequency 28,0 289,0 586,0 402,0 1305.0
% within SGFT 2,1% 22,1% 44,9% 30,8% 100.0%
Chi Square Test: 56,169; p-value < 0,001. 
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Table 4 shows the contingency table of the “manager” and “rating agency” variables. 
As can be observed, the overall market share of the different agencies (see last row) is 
not homogenously in line with the participation of each of those agencies for each of the 
managers, with certain preferences being noted by the managers for different agencies, 
thus rejecting H1a. Even though DBRS has a global market share of 2.1%, it attains 6.2% 
(three times higher) among the funds set up by GestiCaixa (GC). If we focus on the most 
important agencies, it can be seen that Fitch, with an overall market share of 22%, reaches 
32% among the funds set up by Ahorro y Titulización (AyT). This preference of AyT for 
Fitch has a logical consequence, low contracting by other agencies. In this case, it can be 
seen that AyT particularly contracts Moody’s services to a lower extent (37%) than the 
other agencies (45%). Similarly, it can be seen that Gestión de Activos Titulizados (GAT) 
contracts Moody’s services in an unusually intense way (13% over the mean), while it 
“discriminates” against the other “suppliers”, particularly in the case of SP (7.5% less share 
than the average). 
After performing a similar analysis to the one above, but crossing the choice of rating 
agency with the type of collateral of the securitization bonds, we obtain the contingency 
table represented in Table 5. It can be here noted that the distribution of the choice of the 
rating agency is not independent of the type of collateral securing the securitization bonds 
examined, thus rejecting H1b. Given that both H1a and H1b are rejected, H1 must likewise 
be rejected.
Given that these preferences for one or other official agency is due to whether or not 
there are rating shopping (a kind of rating arbitrage) business practices, the ratings awarded 
to the securitization operations need to be analyzed, as set out in hypothesis H2. Therefore, 
we will now proceed to analyze the ratings awarded for the securitization bonds issued in 
Spain, taking into consideration factors such as the number of rating agencies, the type of 
collateral or the contracting manager. 
Before discussing the results obtained from analyzing the ratings, it should be noted 
that in order to streamline the quantitative processing of the data, it has been decided to 
convert the alphanumerical scale of the ratings used by the rating agencies to an ordinal nu-
merical scale (Table 6), downward from a level 22 associated to a maximum score (AAA/
Aaa) to a level 1 associated to a minimum credit quality (Level D or “bankrupt”), in line 
with other studies (Firla-Cuchra 2005; Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson 2006; Schaber 2008; 
Vink and Thibeault 2008a, 2008b; Peña-Cerezo et al. 2014). 
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Table 5
Distribution of the rating agencies for each main type of collateral
Source: Compilation based on information supplied by the prospectuses registered by CNMV associated to each 
of the securitization funds set up in Spain between 1993 and 2011. Note: PH means “Participaciones Hipotecar-
ias” (prime mortgage loans); CTH means “Certificados de Transmisión Hipotecaria” (Mortgage Transfer Certifi-
cates); Ent. loans means “Enterprise loans”; SME loans means “Small and Medium Enterprise loans”; P&C loans 
means Personal & Consumer loans, and CH means “Cédulas Hipotecarias” or the Mortgage Covered Bonds. The 
Chi Square test associated to the uniformity in the distributions has a level of significance under 1% and therefore 
the null hypothesis of distribution equality. It is therefore concluded that the choice of the rating agency is not 
independent from the underlying type of collateral.
  AGENCY TOTAL  DBRS FITCH MOODY’S SP
PH
Observed frequency 0 22 99 55 176
Expected frequency 3.6 38.7 78.9 54.9 176.0
% within COLLATERAL 0.0% 12.5% 56.3% 31.3% 100.0%
CTH
Observed frequency 7 98 199 138 442
Expected frequency 9.1 97.1 198.0 137.8 442.0
% within COLLATERAL 1.6% 22.2% 45.0% 31.2% 100.0%
ENT. 
LOANS
Observed frequency 11 23 57 31 122
Expected frequency 2.5 26.8 54.7 38.0 122.0
% within COLLATERAL 9.0% 18.9% 46.7% 25.4% 100.0%
SME 
LOANS
Observed frequency 7 47 81 50 185
Expected frequency 3.8 40.6 82.9 57.7 185.0
% within COLLATERAL 3.8% 25.4% 43.8% 27.0% 100.0%
P&C 
LOANS
Observed frequency 1 19 40 31 91
Expected frequency 1.9 20.0 40.8 28.4 91.0
% within COLLATERAL 1.1% 20.9% 44.0% 34.1% 100.0%
CH
Observed frequency 0 68 89 88 245
Expected frequency 5.1 53.8 109.8 76.4 245.0
% within COLLATERAL 0.0% 27.8% 36.3% 35.9% 100.0%
Total 
Observed frequency 26 277 565 393 1261
Expected frequency 26.0 277.0 565.0 393.0 1261.0
% within COLLATERAL 2.1% 22.0% 44.8% 31.2% 100.0%
Chi Square Test: 66,041; p-value < 0,001.
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Table 6
Correspondence between ratings and rating scale
Table 7 shows the rating of each securitization fund distinguishing the type of rating 
agency for the funds overall, classified by type of collateral and by number of participant 
rating agencies. It can be seen that the DBRS agency has never alone rated any securitiza-
tion fund, but rather it has always done so simultaneously with another agency (Moody’s 
or SP, never with Fitch). Moreover, when there were three participating agencies, DBRS 
was never one of them.
It should be noted that the numerical data in the cells of Table 7 refer to the weighted 
mean rating awarded to the funds by all the participant agencies. This is the reason that 
when there are three agencies (in the four columns on the right), the mean rating coincides 
for each of those three agencies.
Scale MOODY’S S&P FITCH DBRS
    Investment Grade
22 Aaa AAA AAA AAA
21 Aa1 AA+ AA+ AA high
20 Aa2 AA AA AA
19 Aa3 AA- AA- AA low
18 A1 A+ A+ A high
17 A2 A A A
16 A3 A- A- A low
15 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ BBB high
14 Baa2 BBB BBB BBB
13 Baa3 BBB- BBB- BBB low
12 Ba1 BB+ BB+ BB high
Speculative Grade
11 Ba2 BB BB BB
10 Ba3 BB- BB- BB low
9 B1 B+ B+ B high
8 B2 B B B
7 B3 B- B- B low
6 Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ CCC high
5 Caa2 CCC CCC CCC
4 Caa3 CCC- CCC- CCC low
3 Ca CC CC CC
2 C C C C
1 D (bankrupt) D (bankrupt) D (bankrupt) D (bankrupt)
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Before moving on to analyze the difference by agencies, it can be seen (see shaded 
columns) that the greater the number of agencies involved, the higher the mean rating 
obtained by the fund. The fact that more than one official agency is asked to rate the issues 
is a signal that a specific agency is not chosen for its potential advantageous assessment. 
Therefore, it can be seen that for the funds overall, there is a direct relationship between the 
mean quality of the issues and the number of ratings requested (Peña-Cerezo et al., 2013). 
In turn, these differences are more bloated the lower the mean quality of the collateral. In 
other words, the number of ratings requested may be interpreted as a quality index of the 
ratings awarded, and of the fund as such, and this signal is stronger the lower the quality of 
the hedged asset. Specifically, the robust equality mean significance test (Brown-Forsythe 
test4) shows that these differences are statistically significant (p-value < 1%) for the set of 
the securitization funds. Depending on the collateral, these differences are not statistically 
significant for the case of the PH, CTH and CH, and are statistically significant for the case 
of the Ent. Loans, SME Loans and P&C Loans. In short, hypothesis H2b must be consid-
ered to be verified.
In short, a certain indication of differences existing in the ratings awarded can be ob-
served, depending on the rating agency and the number of participating agencies. 
Nonetheless, those differences do not corroborate in themselves the rating shopping 
hypothesis, given that to do so the relations between abnormally high (low) shares with 
the awarding of abnormally generous (poor) ratings must be related. We believe that fur-
ther analysis of this relationship is required by carrying out a comparison, no longer using 
funds, but rather using tranches, where the differences are noted in ratings awarded by 
different agencies on the same tranche, thus eliminating other factors that can distort the 
analysis, along with the year of the issue, fund design by the manager, underlying objective 
differences, etc. Table 8 is therefore constructed, which calculates the mean rating awarded 
by each of the agencies for the securitization bond tranches that are simultaneously rated 
by more than one agency. Note that those mean ratings are ostensibly lower than those in 
the previous table (Table 7) as in that table, the weighted mean rating per fund (where the 
ratings of the senior tranches, that have very high ratings, are much more important than 
those of the mezzanine/equity tranches), while in Table 8, the arithmetic mean of all the 
tranches assessed by two or more agencies is calculated, without weighting each of those 
tranches by the volume.
Table 8 continues corroborating, considering the bonds overall and with all the col-
lateral grouped together, that the larger the number of agencies involved, the greater the 
quality awarded to the tranche in question. In turn, it can be seen that when that same issue 
is rated by more than one agency, there are frequently rating differences according to the 
rating agency and the type of collateral. Only in the case of the issues underwritten by PH, 
the most secured collateral used in Spanish securitization, no significant differences are 
observed between the rating awarded when there are three rating agencies. 
4  It was decided to use this non-parametric test given the widespread lack of normality associated to the variables 
studied.
Does rating shopping exist in spanish securitization issues?
Cuadernos de Gestión Vol. 15 - Nº 1 (2015), pp. 119-142 ISSN: 1131 - 6837138
Ta
ble
 8
 R
at
in
g 
of
 t
he
 s
er
ie
s 
of
 s
ec
ur
it
iz
at
io
n 
bo
nd
s 
th
at
 w
it
h 
m
or
e 
th
an
 o
ne
 r
at
in
g,
 c
la
ss
ifi
ed
 b
y 
ty
pe
 o
f 
co
lla
te
ra
l
So
ur
ce
: C
om
pi
la
tio
n 
ba
se
d 
on
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
su
pp
li
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
pr
os
pe
ct
us
es
 r
eg
is
te
re
d 
by
 C
N
M
V
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
to
 e
ac
h 
of
 th
e 
se
cu
ri
ti
za
ti
on
 f
un
ds
 s
et
 u
p 
in
 S
pa
in
 b
et
w
ee
n 
19
93
 
an
d 
20
11
. 
N
ot
e:
 N
ot
e:
 P
H
 m
ea
ns
 “
P
ar
ti
ci
pa
ci
on
es
 H
ip
ot
ec
ar
ia
s”
 (
pr
im
e 
m
or
tg
ag
e 
lo
an
s)
; 
C
T
H
 m
ea
ns
 “
C
er
ti
fi
ca
do
s 
de
 T
ra
ns
m
is
ió
n 
H
ip
ot
ec
ar
ia
” 
(M
or
tg
ag
e 
T
ra
ns
fe
r 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
rat
ing
s: 
3
Nu
mb
er 
of 
rat
ing
s: 
2
CO
LA
T.
FI
TC
H
M
OO
DY
S
P
M
ea
n
FI
TC
H
M
OO
DY
M
ea
n
FI
TC
H
S
P
M
ea
n
M
OO
DY
S
P
M
ea
n
M
OO
DY
DB
RS
M
ea
n
P
H
18
.00
(S
-F
: 
-0,
03
6)
18
.25
(M
-F
: 
-1,
32
7)
18
.0
4
(S
M
:
-1,
10
0)
18
.10
18
.09
17
.6
4
17
.86
(-2
,28
**
)
19
.25
19
.50
19
.38
(-1
,00
0)
17
.22
17
.37
17
.29
(-1
,26
1)
CT
H
18
.03
(S
-F
: 
-3,
17
**
*)
18
.0
4
(M
-F
: 
-0
,0
45
)
17
.85
(S
-M
: 
-2,
67
**
*)
17
.97
17
.0
4
16
.91
16
.98
(-1
,61
9)
17
.23
17
.12
17
.17
(-1
,95
*)
17
.08
17
.13
17
.10
(-0
,08
0)
13
.50
14
.3
0
13
.90
(-
1,
47
3)
EN
T. 
L.
16
.4
1
(S
-F
:
-0,
50
0)
15
.83
(M
-F
:
-2
,4
64
**
)
16
.3
4
(S
-M
:
-2,
76
**
*)
16
.20
15
.53
15
.16
15
.3
4
(-0
,56
3)
18
.00
17
.5
4
17
.77
(-2
,8*
**
)
17
.6
4
17
.70
17
.67
(-0
,23
8)
15
.4
8
15
.36
15
.4
2
(-0
,56
2)
SM
E 
L.
19
.1
4
(S
-F
:
-2
,4
1*
*)
18
.70
(M
-F
:
-2,
23
**
)
18
.78
(S
-M
:
-0,
57
6)
18
.87
18
.09
17
.89
17
.99
(-2
,5*
*)
18
.16
17
.95
18
.05
(-1
,06
9)
17
.62
17
.91
17
.77
(-2
,5*
*)
19
.27
19
.4
5
19
.36
(-
0,
44
7)
P
&
C
 L
.
18
.56
(S
-F
:
-1,
89
*) 
18
.13
(M
-F
:
-1,
81
*)
18
.25
(S
-M
:
-0,
70
7)
18
.31
17
.50
17
.25
17
.38
(-0
.68
0)
16
.4
5
16
.4
5
16
.4
5
(-0
,00
0)
18
.00
18
.07
18
.03
(-
0,
50
4)
12
.33
12
.67
12
.50
(-1
,00
0)
Av
era
ge
18
.0
4
(S
-F
:
-3,
5*
**
)
17
.89
(M
-F
:
-2,
11
**
)
17
.86
(S
-M
:
-0
,2
74
)
17
.93
17
.25
16
.97
17
.11
(-3
,37
**
*)
17
.82
17
.71
17
.76
(-2
,9*
**
)
17
.51
17
.6
4
17
.57
(-
1,
74
*)
15
.15
15
.4
5
15
.30
(-
1,
42
9)
Miguel Á. Peña-Cerezo / Arturo Rodríguez-Castellanos / Francisco J. Ibáñez-Hernández 
ISSN: 1131 - 6837  Cuadernos de Gestión Vol. 15 - Nº 1 (2015), pp. 119-144 139
C
er
ti
fi
ca
te
s)
; 
E
nt
. 
lo
an
s 
m
ea
ns
 “
E
nt
er
pr
is
e 
lo
an
s”
; 
S
M
E
 l
oa
ns
 m
ea
ns
 “
S
m
al
l 
an
d 
M
ed
iu
m
 E
nt
er
pr
is
e 
lo
an
s”
; 
P
&
C
 l
oa
ns
 m
ea
ns
 P
er
so
na
l 
&
 C
on
su
m
er
 l
oa
ns
; A
dm
in
. 
m
ea
ns
 c
re
di
ts
 to
 P
ub
li
c 
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
ns
; O
th
er
s 
in
cl
ud
es
 th
e 
C
D
O
 s
ec
ur
it
iz
at
io
ns
 (
tr
ea
su
ry
 b
on
ds
, s
im
pl
e 
bo
nd
s,
 e
tc
.)
, w
in
d 
po
w
er
 c
ol
le
ct
io
n 
ri
gh
ts
, s
ub
or
di
na
te
d 
de
bt
, 
et
c.
; I
C
O
 m
ea
ns
 “
In
st
it
ut
o 
O
fi
ci
al
 d
e 
C
ré
di
to
” 
or
 O
ffi
ci
al
 C
re
di
t I
ns
ti
tu
te
 lo
an
s;
 T
ar
if
f.
 D
ef
. m
ea
ns
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 d
er
iv
in
g 
fr
om
 th
e 
E
le
ct
ri
c 
Ta
ri
ff
 D
efi
ci
t;
 N
uc
l. 
M
or
. m
ea
ns
 
N
uc
le
ar
 M
or
at
or
iu
m
; C
H
 m
ea
ns
 “
C
éd
ul
as
 H
ip
ot
ec
ar
ia
s”
 o
r 
th
e 
M
or
tg
ag
e 
C
ov
er
ed
 B
on
ds
, a
nd
 C
T
 m
ea
ns
 “
C
éd
ul
as
 T
er
ri
to
ri
al
es
” 
or
 R
eg
io
na
l C
ov
er
ed
 B
on
ds
. T
he
 le
as
t 
re
le
va
nt
 c
at
eg
or
ie
s (
as
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f i
ss
ue
s s
im
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y 
ra
te
d 
by
 th
e 
tw
o 
ag
en
ci
es
 is
 n
on
-e
xi
st
en
t o
r v
er
y 
sm
al
l) 
an
d 
th
e 
C
H
 h
av
e 
be
en
 e
xc
lu
de
d 
(a
s t
he
y 
al
w
ay
s h
av
e 
a 
22
 ra
ti
ng
).
 N
ei
th
er
 th
e 
bo
nd
s 
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y 
ra
te
d 
by
 F
it
ch
 a
nd
 D
B
R
S
 (a
s 
th
ey
 d
o 
no
t e
xi
st
) n
or
 th
os
e 
by
 S
P 
an
d 
D
B
R
S
 (a
s 
th
ey
 a
re
 v
er
y 
sc
ar
ce
: 1
1 
tr
an
ch
es
) a
re
 in
cl
ud
ed
. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
r g
iv
en
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
is
 in
di
ca
te
s t
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f t
he
 n
on
-p
ar
am
et
ic
 W
ilc
ox
on
 si
gn
ed
 ra
nk
ed
 te
st
 to
 c
om
pa
re
 tw
o 
re
la
te
d 
sa
m
pl
es
. W
he
n 
th
re
e 
ag
en
ci
es
 a
re
 si
m
ul
ta
-
ne
ou
sl
y 
ra
tin
g 
a 
si
ng
le
 is
su
e 
(le
ft 
bl
oc
k)
, t
he
 W
ilc
ox
on
 te
st
 v
al
ue
 is
 g
iv
en
 fo
r t
he
 th
re
e 
po
ss
ib
le
 c
om
pa
ra
tiv
es
: S
P 
vs
. F
itc
h 
(n
ot
at
io
n:
 S
-F
, i
n 
th
e 
Fi
tc
h 
co
lu
m
n)
, M
oo
dy
’s
 
vs
. F
it
ch
 (
no
ta
ti
on
: M
-F
, i
n 
th
e 
M
oo
dy
’s
 c
ol
um
n)
 y
 S
P 
vs
. M
oo
dy
’s
 (
no
ta
ti
on
: S
-M
, i
n 
th
e 
S
P 
co
lu
m
n)
. *
/*
*/
**
* 
de
no
te
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 1
0%
, 5
%
 a
nd
 1
%
 r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
Does rating shopping exist in spanish securitization issues?
Cuadernos de Gestión Vol. 15 - Nº 1 (2015), pp. 119-142 ISSN: 1131 - 6837140
In the SME segment (the category with more risk and lower average ratings), Fitch offers 
ratings significantly higher than Moody’s (0.44) and SP (0.36). And effectively, both the 
aggregate level (+3.4%) and specifically in the case of TdA (+12.8%) or AyT (+13.1%), a 
certain tendency to use the Fitch services can be observed, particularly to the detriment to SP, 
which could be considered a practice compatible with rating shopping. In this same segment 
and in the same line, similar results can be observed for SP: a coincidence between signifi-
cantly reduced market shares and mean ratings awarded until the market average. In short, 
for SME loan segments, the distributions of the market shares and of the ratings awarded 
by the CRAs in Spain would be compatible with the existence of rating shopping practices 
(verifying H3).
However, this evidence is not observed for the CTH, Enterprise loans and Personal & 
Consumer loans, which means that H3 has to be rejected. Thus, SP is the agency that offers 
rather lower ratings (0.18/0.19 points) for the mortgage transfer certificates with respect to 
Fitch and Moody’s. From the point of view of the market shares of the agencies, no relation-
ship can be extracted, given that even though Fitch is the agency particularly contracted by 
the AyT manager and it effectively provides rather higher ratings, it is also true that it does so 
particularly to the detriment of Moody’s which is, precisely, the other agency that provides 
relatively favourable ratings. In other words, there are no sound indications of agency selec-
tion, in the CTH tranche, based on achieving more favourable ratings.
For the case of Enterprise loans, Moody’s stands out for relatively low ratings compared 
to Fitch (0.58 points) and SP (0.51 points). Nonetheless, Moody’s is not seen to have a low 
market share in this segment, with the presence of rating shopping being again ruled out.
In the case of personal loans, the greater difference (0.43) between the rating provided 
by Fitch (18.56) with respect to that awarded by Moody’s (18.13). However, when crossing 
this information with the distribution of the market shares of these agencies in this collateral 
segment, no indication of rating arbitrage can be seen.
Finally, if all the bonds are considered aggregately, irrespective of the type of collateral, it 
can be seen that when the series of securitization bonds has been rated by the three agencies, 
Fitch gives more generous ratings than Moody’s (0.15) and SP (0.18). This favourable bias in 
the ratings by Fitch when there are three agencies involved is upheld when there are only two 
rating agencies. Thus, when there are two (and not three) agencies involved simultaneously 
in the assessment of the same bonds, Fitch offers more favourable ratings than Moody’s and 
SP. On an aggregate basis (not broken down by type of collateral), the differences existing 
between the rating awarded by Fitch compared to Moody’s (0.28) and compared to SP (0,11) 
turn out to be significant.
In short, despite biases existing between the ratings awarded by the different agencies, 
there is no evidence of a rating shopping strategy on the Spanish securitization market, or at 
least of it being widespread to all the types of securitization bonds and managers, bearing in 
mind that no clear correspondence is observed between “generosity” in the assessment by an 
agency and its abnormally high market share, for all the collaterals analyzed. For the SME 
segment (the most risky) compatible patterns with rating shopping are observed; on the other 
hand, in the other segments the abnormally high (reduced) shares associated to the CRAs do 
not match with abnormally generous (reduced) awarding of ratings. In summary, unlike pre-
vious papers focused on other markets (Kiff, 2010; Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2010), our re-
sults do not clearly support the existence of rating shopping in the case of the Spanish market.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Three official credit rating agencies (four since 2010) have traditionally operated on the 
Spanish securitization market (1993-2011) and it is therefore considered a sector with an 
oligopolistic market structure. 
In addition, the relationship between the number of agencies contracted to rate a single 
issue and the quality of the rating awarded is noteworthy. There is a direct relationship be-
tween the mean quality of the issues and the number of ratings requested. In turn, these dif-
ferences are more bloated the lower the average quality of the collateral. In other words, the 
number of ratings requested may be interpreted as a quality index of the ratings awarded, 
and of the fund as such, and this signal is stronger the lower the quality of the hedged asset.
On the other hand, the global market share of the different agencies is not distributed 
uniformly, either in terms of the contracting securitization fund manager or in terms of the 
type of collateral on which the fund is established. Certain preferences by the managers 
are noted when choosing the rating agency which could be taken to be an indicator of the 
existence of the rating shopping phenomenon in the case of securitization in Spain. Once 
all the results have been analyzed, we can conclude that there is no widespread evidence 
that the preference when picking the rating agency is related to rating shopping. Despite 
the existence of significant differences between the ratings awarded by the different official 
agencies, a correspondence between the “generosity” in the rating by an agency and its 
abnormally high market share is not noted for all the collateral categories
The results suggest that inflation in the ratings of the securitizations in Spain during 
the years prior to the financial crisis could have been due to a great extent to the problems 
associated to the market structure of the rating agencies, to the high degree of complex-
ity of those structured products and to the excellent historical default rates on which the 
credit risk was assessed during the long period of economic and credit growth, rather than 
a specific problem of rating shopping. Thus, only in one category analyzed (SME loans, 
the category with the worst average rating) has behaviour compatible with rating shopping 
been observed, and this phenomenon cannot be generalized to the whole securitization 
market in Spain. The relative simplicity of the design of the securitizations in Spain may 
have discouraged rating shopping. 
We believe that future extensions of this analysis should include the impact that the 
subprime and sovereign debt crises in Spain may have had on the rating market. In turn, 
controlling the choice of the rating and its quality by means of models that simultaneously 
integrate the type of collateral and the rating agency as explanatory factors, may be a way 
to improve knowledge of the rating shopping phenomenon. Furthermore, including rating 
reviews (downgrades or upgrades) to the initial ratings in the analysis would provide a 
more comprehensive view of the studied phenomenon. 
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